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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
IX.

MUANICIPAL CORPORATIONS

Annexation of Territory
An action was brought by an owner of realty to review the
determination of a town board in refusing to consent to a petition
for annexation of territory to a village.1 The applicable statute
provides:
A petition for such annexation, . . ., and signed by a majority of the persons residing therein, if any, qualified to vote
for town officers, or by the owners of a majority in value of the

property therein .

.

[Emphasis added.]

Originally the statute contained the term and also instead of
the term or.' The contention of the town board is based on the
premise that the words if any in the statute still necessitate that
a majority of persons residing in the territory, qualified to vote,
must sign the petition. In an earlier decision the court noted
that it was no longer necessary for a petition to carry signatures
of both a majority of property owners and a majority of the
the voters.'
The instant case goes a step further and interprets
the section to mean that a petition can be signed by a majority of
the property holders whether or not there are any qualified voters
in thd area.
In affirming the order of the Appellate Division, which annulled the town board's determination and directed it to execute
its consent, the Court of Appeals stated that the town board merely performs the ministerial function of determining whether the
petition complies with the statute,5 and inferred that any refusal
of consent of the town board must be based solely on the specified
statutory objections.8
Zoning
Although the General City Law gives a city council the right
to restrict the use of property in accordance with a comprehensive
plan, 7 it cannot do so arbitrarily or unreasonably.' Validity of a
zoning ordinance depends upon maintaining a reasonable balance
between the public interests and the opposing private interests in
1. Wright v. Ransom, 307 N.Y. 317, 121 N.E. 2d 244 (1954).
2. VILLAGE LAW § 348.
3. L. 1915 c. 257.
4. Repper v. Patterson, 306 N.Y. 683, 117 N.E. 2d 357 (1954).
5. Accord: In re Village of Spring Valley, 189 Misc. 324, 71 N.Y. S. 2d 848
(Sup. Ct. 1947).
6. See VILLAGE LAW § 348 (2).
7. GENERAL CrrY LAW § 83.
8. 8 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §25.05 (3d ed. 1949).
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the property.' A zoning ordinance cannot deprive an owner from
using his land in a manner for which it was reasonably adapted,1 0
for if a regulation goes too far in restricting the use of land it will
be regarded as a taking of property."1
This past term a property owner asked for a declaratory judgment declaring a zoning ordinance affecting his property invalid. 2
The tract of land is located in the center of a highly developed
business district. The property had been reclassified from a business district to a residential district, and the public's parking
their automobiles on the property was allowed as a nonconforming use. The petitioner, having purchased the land, applied for
and was refused a variance to allow him to construct a shopping
center. After joinder of issue, the property was again reclassified
as a Designed Parking District, which prohibited the use of the
property for any purpose except for the parking of automobiles
and a service station, which was already on the land.
The court held the zoning ordinances unreasonable and arbitrary so as to result in an invasion of property rights and therefore invalid. The court noted that the purchase of property with
the knowledge of the restrictions on it does not prevent the purchaser from contesting their validity, and the application for a
variance, which assumes the validity of the ordinance, does not
prevent a subsequent attack upon its validity. 3
Right to Inspect Public Records
Section 51 of the General Corporation Law, which establishes
the procedure for the prosecution of public officials for illegal acts
also declares that all records of local governmental units are public
records open to inspection by a taxpayer. Sections 893 and 894
of the Greater New York Charter stipulate that the right of inspection shall not apply to certain specified records, including papers
prepared for use in any investigation authorized by the charter.
Under the charter, there is created a Commission of Investigation which is empowered to make investigations as directed by the
Mayor or Council,1 4 and to report the results to them.3
9. Id. § 25.40.
10. Id. § 25.45; Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, 257 N. Y. 221, 177 N. E. 427
(1931).
11. Id. §25.43; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 206 U. S. 393 (1922).
12. Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N. E. 2d
517 (1954).
13. See Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N. Y. 222, 15 N. E. 2d
587 (1938).
14. NEW YORIC CITY CHARTER § 803.
15. NEw YoRK CITY ADMINISTRATMV CODE § 803-1.0.

